A quiet methodological revolution, a modeling revolution, has occurred over the past several decades, almost without discussion. In contrast, the 20th century ended with contentious argument over the utility of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The NHST controversy may have been at least partially irrelevant, because in certain ways the modeling revolution obviated the NHST argument. I begin with a history of NHST and modeling and their relation to one another. Next, I define and illustrate principles involved in developing and evaluating mathematical models. Following, I discuss the difference between using statistical procedures within a rule-based framework and building mathematical models from a scientific epistemology. Only the former is treated carefully in most psychology graduate training. The pedagogical implications of this imbalance and the revised pedagogy required to account for the modeling revolution are described. To conclude, I discuss how attention to modeling implies shifting statistical practice in certain progressive ways. The epistemological basis of statistics has moved away from being a set of procedures, applied mechanistically, and moved toward building and evaluating statistical and scientific models. (Contains 9 footnotes.)