In recent years there has been a remarkable proliferation of ballet competitions. This prompts a number of questions, in particular how much are they affecting current training and performance practice and, more fundamentally, whether the notion of competition may be antithetical to dance as art. Underlying these questions is the issue of judgement. On what basis are decisions made by dance adjudicators and how do they differ from those made by judges of the "aesthetic sports" such as gymnastic or ice skating competitions? In the following article, I examine two prestigious competitions, to try to find some answers to these questions. This leads me to explore the problems that are caused by equating classroom vocabulary with choreographed movement and also to discuss whether the use of nineteenth century dances as the dominant, designated competition variation is leading both judges and competitors to value technical achievement over artistic performance. To do this, I draw on aesthetic theory, which offers a way of distinguishing between aesthetic and artistic judgements. My aim is to instigate a discussion between philosophy and dance, in order to shed light on some of the problems that arise as a result of ballet competitions and to discover whether in fact they can be considered damaging to the future of ballet. (Contains 49 notes.)