The predictable failure of reform has been a characteristic of education systems for some years. However, the tendency of policy makers to attribute blame for any implementation deficit solely to schools and school systems is somewhat at odds with the historical evidence presented in this article. Through the lens of school development planning, the data analysed in this British example support the view that, rather than an unequivocal government position on decentralized governance, the rational approach of policy formulation, initiation and implementation tended to mask considerable ambiguity within the policy cycle. Although the inherent ambiguity of the "tight-loose" design of such early models of decentralization has previously been criticized, ambiguity was also exacerbated by fragmentation. Information concerned with the roles, responsibilities and duties of those responsible for implementing change was late arriving from multiple official sources, and at times inconsistent or contradictory. The resulting uncertain role of planning, a key component of decentralized governance models, left policy open to recontextualization by those most likely to be involved at both the initiation and implementation stages of the reform process. This finding reinforces the work of Ball and Bowe, and Deem and others, who have previously criticized change theorists for over-simplifying the conditions leading to implementation failure. (Contains 92 notes.)