This paper comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler. In this article, Kendler misrepresented contemporary existential-humanistic psychology and conventional (or natural) scientific psychology. With regard to the former, he presented a confused, unwittingly biased, and all-too-stereotypic picture. Aside from failing to cite virtually any contemporary existential-humanistic theorists (with the possible exceptions of Polkinghorne and Smith), he profoundly mischaracterized the phenomenological perspective on which existential-humanistic principles are based (e.g., see Cain & Seeman, 2002, Giorgi, 1970, and Schneider, Bugental, & Pierson, 2002, for an elaboration). To cite but a few problems to which Kendler (2005) fell victim, I consider first his characterization of phenomenological philosophy and psychology as "purely subjective" and "free of any scientific consideration or interpretation" (p. 318). With regard to Kendler's (2005, p. 322) characterization of conventional (or natural scientific) psychological inquiry as "objective" and amoral, there are several problems.