Peer reviewed
ERIC Number: EJ725307
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2005-Oct-1
Pages: 30
Abstractor: Author
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0022-3808
EISSN: N/A
Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous Districts
Callander, Steven
Journal of Political Economy, v113 n5 p1116 Oct 2005
This paper considers a model of elections in which parties compete simultaneously for multiple districts. I show that if districts are heterogeneous, then a unique two-party equilibrium exists under plurality rule in which further entry is deterred. The equilibrium requires that parties choose noncentrist policy platforms and not converge to the ideal policy of the median voter. These characteristics are consistent with empirical observation, in contrast to those of single-district models. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are then characterized and related to Duverger's law. The existence of multiple-party equilibria in this environment is also considered. (Contains 8 notes.)
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Numerical/Quantitative Data; Opinion Papers
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A