Peer reviewedERIC Number: EJ304963
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 1983
Pages: N/A
Abstractor: N/A
ISBN: N/A
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Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.
Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel
Psychological Review, v90 n4 p293-315 Oct 1983
Judgments under uncertainty are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule of probability. Representativeness and availability heuristics can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. Alternative interpretations of this conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it are explored. (Author/BW)
Descriptors: Cognitive Processes, Error Patterns, Evaluative Thinking, Heuristics, Intuition, Probability, Theories
Publication Type: Information Analyses; Opinion Papers; Journal Articles
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
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Authoring Institution: N/A
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A
