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ERIC Number: ED203477
Record Type: RIE
Publication Date: 1980-Nov
Pages: 53
Abstractor: N/A
Reference Count: 0
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: N/A
Institutional Structure of School Finance Elections. Final Report.
Rosenthal, Howard
Cross-sectional analysis of 1971-1972 budget elections and expenditure data in 111 large K-12 school districts in Oregon indicates that the "agenda control" and "fiscal illusion" models predict expenditure levels better than the standard "median voter" model. The median voter model assumes that district expenditures are based on the median voter's demand for spending. The agenda control model predicts expenditures on the basis of the budget proposed by the "agenda setter" (usually the school board) and the "reversion level" to which spending falls if a school budget fails. Both these factors interact with voter turnout and income, community size, and the number of elections allowed on one budget. The fiscal illusion model predicts that, insofar as voters lack information on state or federal grant income to the district, they will not reduce spending in reaction to grand levels. Tests on the Oregon data confirm, first, that school district spending was unaffected by grant levels, indicating much voter illusion; and, second, that school boards or other agenda setters seemed to be using the threat of reversion-level closures to increase expenditures beyond the voters' desires. (RW)
Publication Type: Reports - Research
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: National Inst. of Education (DHEW), Washington, DC.
Authoring Institution: N/A
Identifiers: Agenda Control Model; Agenda Setting; Fiscal Illusion Model; Median Voter Model; Oregon; Voting Behavior